



The European Union in defence and space

FLASH EUROBAROMETER 574

REPORT January 2026

Flash Eurobarometer 574

The European Union in defence and space: perceptions and expectations of European citizens

Survey conducted by Demoscop at the request of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS)

Survey coordinated by the European Commission, Directorate-General for Communication (DG COMM 'Public Opinion and Citizens Engagement' Unit)

This document does not represent the point of view of the European Commission. The interpretations and opinions contained in it are solely those of the authors.

Project title

Flash Eurobarometer S74 — The European Union in defence and space: perceptions and expectations of European citizens

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Document prepared by Pierre Dieumegard for [Europe-Democracy-Esperanto](#)

The purpose of this "provisional" document is to enable more people in the European Union to become aware of documents produced by the European Union (and financed by their taxes).

If there are no translations, citizens are excluded from the debate.

This document "Eurobarometer" [only existed in English](#), in a pdf-file. From the initial file, we created a odt-file, prepared by Libre Office software, for machine translation to other languages. The results are now [available in all official languages](#).

It is desirable that the EU administration takes over the translation of important documents. "Important documents" are not only laws and regulations, but also the important information needed to make informed decisions together.

In order to discuss our common future together, and to enable reliable translations, the international language Esperanto would be very useful because of its simplicity, regularity and accuracy.

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Introduction

on the methods applied to conduct the survey is available at the end of this report.

The European Union operates within a complex and rapidly evolving geopolitical environment. The fieldwork for this Flash Eurobarometer (FLS74) was conducted amid significant international developments, including ongoing negotiations concerning the war in Ukraine, escalating tensions in the Middle East, and renewed global attention to political events in Venezuela and Greenland. The survey was carried out in a context characterised by heightened international uncertainty and evolving security dynamics at the outset of 2026.

Within this context, Flash Eurobarometer S74 explores EU citizens' perceptions of security threats, trust in the Union's defence role, support for defence investment, and views on space programmes. The findings enhance understanding of public opinion on issues central to European defence and space policy and provide evidence to support policy development within the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS). By analysing the relationship between current geopolitical trends and citizens' expectations, the survey contributes to guiding the EU's future direction in the defence and space domains.

Specifically, this survey aims to provide evidence-based insights into:

- EU citizens' perceptions of security threats in the current geopolitical context
- Levels of trust in the European Union as an actor in collective defence
- Public support for increased EU investment in defence capabilities
- Perceived impact of EU space programmes
- Priority areas for future EU space policy as identified by citizens

On behalf of the European Commission, Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS), Demoscopy interviewed a representative sample of the population of EU citizens, residents in one of the 27 Member States of the European Union, and aged 15 years and over.

Between the 5th and 12th of January 2026, 27,292 interviews were conducted using a CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interviewing) data collection mode. Results have been statistically weighted so that each Member State contributes to the EU27 aggregate in proportion to its actual share of the total EU population, meaning that countries with smaller populations have a correspondingly smaller weight in the overall EU results. A technical note

Notes

- Survey results are subject to sampling tolerances meaning that not all apparent differences between countries and socio-demographic groups may be statistically significant.
- Survey data are weighted according to the population distributions in each country by gender, age group, education level and region of residence, using post stratification weighting. The EU27 are weighted according to the size of the 15+ population of each EU Member State.
- Percentages may not add up to 100%, as they are rounded to the nearest percent. Due to rounding, it may also happen that the percentages for separate response options shown in the charts do not exactly add up to the totals mentioned in the text. Response percentages will exceed 100% if the question allowed respondents to select multiple responses.
- In this report, countries are referred to by their official abbreviation as indicated below.

BE	Belgium	FR	France	NL	Netherlands
BG	Bulgaria	HR	Croatia	AT	Austria
CZ	Czechia	IT	Italy	PL	Poland
DK	Denmark	CY	Rep. of Cyprus *	PT	Portugal
DE	Germany	Lv	Latvia	RO	Romania
EE	Estonia	LT	Lithuania	SI	Slovenia
IE	Ireland	LU	Luxembourg	SK	Slovakia
EL	Greece	HU	Hungary	FI	Finland
ES	Spain	MT	Malta	SE	Sweden

* Cyprus as a whole is one of the 27 EU Member States. For practical reasons, interviews are only carried out in the part of the country controlled by the government of the Republic of Cyprus

1. Key findings

Widespread perception of security threats to the respondent's country across Europe, but limited translation into personal concern.

- The perception of security threat to the respondent's country is widely shared across Europe: more than two thirds of Europeans (68%) agree that their country's security is threatened in the current international context, including 27% who strongly agree. This perception extends across all Member States without exception, with levels ranging from 49% in Slovenia to 80% in France, and transcends demographic divides, with minimal variation by gender (65% of men, 70% of women) or age (66% among those aged 55+ to 71% among 15-24-year-olds).
- France (80%), the Netherlands (77%), Denmark (77%), Cyprus (75%) and Germany (75%) record the highest levels of perceived security threat to their country, while Slovenia (50%), Croatia (51%) and the Czech Republic (52%) record the lowest. However, even in countries with the lowest levels, around half of respondents still perceive the security of their country as threatened.
- At the same time, Europeans draw a clear distinction between threats to their country and threats to themselves personally. When asked whether their own personal safety is at risk, 42% agree, while a majority (51%) disagree. This 26 percentage-point gap with a security threat to their country suggests that Europeans view current security challenges primarily through a collective, geopolitical lens rather than as an immediate danger to their daily lives.

Majority of Europeans express trust in the to strengthen security and defence

- A majority of Europeans (52%) express trust in the EU's capacity to strengthen security and defence, including 12% who trust it completely and 40% who tend to trust it. However, 43% express distrust (27% tend not to trust, 16% do not trust at all).
- Trust is higher among younger Europeans: 61% of 15-24-year-olds trust the EU in terms of security and defence, compared with 49% among those aged 55 and over. Gender differences are limited (54% of men, 50% of women).
- Trust varies considerably across Member States, ranging from 76% in Luxembourg to 40% in France and Greece. Except for Spain (64%), smaller or medium-sized countries tend to express greater confidence. The EU's three largest Member States all record trust levels below 50%: Germany (47%), Italy (47%) and France (40%).

- Threat perceptions toward one's country and trust in the EU do not correlate systematically. France combines the highest perceived threat (80%) with the lowest trust (40%), a 40-percentage-point gap. By contrast, Baltic States display both high threat perception and high trust. These patterns suggest that confidence in EU-level action depends less on perceived threats than on each Member State's existing capacity for autonomous defence responses.

Views on EU defence investment differ, but a third is calling for increased spending.

- When asked to current investment levels, 32% of Europeans say the EU does not invest enough in security, while 14% consider it invests too much. The prevailing view is that current investment levels are appropriate (42%), also in view of the latest EU initiatives in this field. Views on defence and national spending are similar: 34% say their country does not invest enough, 17% say too much, and 39% consider current levels appropriate.
- Demand for increased EU investment rises with age, from 27% among 15–24-year-olds to 35% among those aged 55+. Those who perceive their country's security as threatened are more likely to say the EU underinvests (38%) compared with those who do not share this view (21%).
- National perceptions vary considerably, from 23% in Slovakia and 24% in Sweden, Czechia, Luxembourg and Austria saying that the EU does not spend enough on defence and security programmes to 43% in France, 38% in Ireland, and 37% in Lithuania, Poland and Finland. Furthermore, in all Member States but Austria, those who believe the EU underinvests outnumber those who consider spending excessive, even in countries where demand for increased investment is the lowest (In Austria, 24% says 'not enough', 25% 'too much').

In this context of widespread security concerns, security and defence clearly emerges as Europeans' top priority for EU space policy.

Against the backdrop of widespread perceived threats to the security of their country, European citizens prioritise security and defence applications when asked about EU space policy: 34% mention it as their top priority, ahead of Action on the environment and climate change (20%), industrial competitiveness and growth (13%), and safer mobility and transport (10%). When combining both answers provided by respondents, 53% cite security and defence as a priority. This hierarchy reflects the broader security anxieties captured throughout the survey, where more than two thirds of Europeans agree their country's security is threatened in the current international context.

EU space programmes are recognised for their economic impact, but perceived effects on daily life remain limited.

- 45% of Europeans consider that EU space programmes have an important impact on the European economy (13% "very important", 32% "fairly important"). 32% consider they have an important impact on citizens' everyday lives (9% "very important", 23% "fairly important"), indicating a disconnect between perceived economic significance and tangible user benefits.
- Perceptions of economic impact vary considerably across Member States, ranging from 63% in Cyprus to 26% in Sweden. Younger respondents (55% among 15–24 year-olds), men (49% vs 42% for women), and employed citizens are more likely to recognize its economic impact.

2. European Security and defence: perceptions and expectations

2.1. Perceptions of security threat to one's country in the current international context.

In the current international context, more than two thirds of Europeans believe their country's security is under threat.

The perception that security to their country is under threat is widely shared among Europeans. More than two thirds (68%) agree that their country's security is threatened in the current international context, including over a quarter (27%) who strongly agree. This high level of concern reflects a collective awareness of geopolitical tensions affecting the European continent. However, Europeans draw a clear distinction between threats to their country and threats to themselves personally. When asked whether their own personal safety is at risk, opinions are more divided: only 42% agree, while a majority (51%) disagree. The intensity of concern is also lower, with just 12% strongly agreeing (less than half the proportion observed for the security of the respondent's country with 27%). This gap of 26 percentage points between perceived national threat (68%) and perceived personal risk (42%) suggests that security concerns remain more collective than personal.

Q1a Given the current international context, to what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statement?

Base: EU27 (%)

The security of (OUR COUNTRY) is threatened



My personal safety is at risk



█ Strongly agree █ Somewhat agree █ Somewhat disagree █ Strongly disagree █ Don't know / No answer

The European Union in defence and space: perceptions and expectations of European citizens

In almost all European Union countries, a majority of citizens believe that their country's security is under threat.


This perception extends across all Member States, without exception. In most countries, more than two thirds of respondents consider their country's security to be at risk. In several cases, this proportion reaches or exceeds 75%. Notably, in many countries, a quarter or even a third of the population says they "strongly agree" with this view. Such a pronounced level of concern indicates that the sense of insecurity is not superficial but deeply rooted.

While this perception is widespread throughout Europe, its intensity varies significantly from one country to another. France records the highest level of concern: 80% of respondents believe that the country's security is under threat, including 39% who "strongly agree." Germany follows closely, with 75% (including 34% who "strongly agree"). It is noteworthy that these two countries, despite not being on the front line of geopolitical tensions with Russia, display the highest levels of concern. This likely reflects the citizens intensity of recent national debates on defensive sovereignty and military spending, which have been particularly prominent over the last years.

Denmark ranks third, with 77% of respondents expressing concern, including one third who say they strongly agree. This result might be explained by the immediate political context: the survey was conducted just a few days after the US President publicly expressed his desire for Greenland, a Danish territory, to come under US control. Among the other highly concerned countries are the Netherlands (77%), Cyprus (75%), and Lithuania (73%).

Q1a Given the current international context, to what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statement? **The security of (OUR COUNTRY) is threatened**

Base:EU27 (%)



The Baltic States more broadly, Estonia (67%) and Latvia (66%), also show a strong majority perceiving security threats, which is consistent with their geographical proximity to Russia and their historical experience. By contrast, Slovenia (49%), Croatia (51%), and the Czech Republic (52%) record the lowest levels of concern. However, even in these countries, around half of respondents still consider security of their country to be under threat, demonstrating that security-related anxiety is widespread across the European Union.

Perceptions of insecurity in the country are widespread across all ages and genders.


While opinion surveys often reveal significant socio-demographic divides, the perception of security threats to their country is widely shared across the European population. The sense that one's country is under threat transcends the usual divides of ages and gender. Across all age groups, solid majorities perceive their country's security as threatened, with proportions ranging from 66% among those aged 55 and over to 71% among 15-24-year-olds. The five- percentage-point gap between the youngest and oldest age groups is remarkably narrow, indicating a broad consensus that goes through generations. Similarly, the gender gap is small: 65% of men and 70% of women agree that their country's security is under threat.

Q1a Given the current international context, to what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statement?

The security of (OUR COUNTRY) is threatened

Base: EU27 (%)

Total 'Agree'



2.2. Degree of trust in the EU to strengthen security and defence in Europe

A majority of Europeans trust the EU to strengthen security and defence.


A narrow majority of Europeans (52%) express trust in the European Union's capacity to strengthen security and defence, including 12% who trust it completely and 40% who tend to trust it.

This level of confidence is particularly noteworthy given that defence and security have traditionally been areas of national sovereignty. However, opinion remains divided: 43% express distrust (27% tend not to trust, 16% do not trust at all), while 5% are unable to express an opinion.

Q2 To what extent do you trust the European Union to strengthen security and defence in Europe and better protect its citizens?

Don't know / No answer 5%

Base: EU27 (%)




While a majority in most Member States trust the EU to strengthen security and defence, levels of trust are comparatively lower in the EU '5 three largest countries: Germany, France and Italy

Trust in the EU's capacity to strengthen security and defence varies considerably across Member States, ranging from 76% in Luxembourg to 40% in France and Greece. At the upper end of the spectrum, alongside Luxembourg (76%), Portugal (74%), Cyprus (73%), and Lithuania (71%) display the highest levels of confidence, followed by Denmark and Estonia (both 68%), and Malta and Sweden (both 67%). By contrast, France and Greece (both 40%), Austria (43%), Bulgaria (44%), the Czech Republic (46%), Italy (47%), and Germany (47%) record the lowest trust levels. A notable pattern emerges when examining these results by country size. With the exception of Spain (where trust reaches 64%) it is predominantly in smaller or medium-sized countries where populations express the greatest confidence in EU action on security and defence. Most strikingly, the European Union's three largest Member States by population all record trust levels below 50%: Germany (47%), France (40%), and Italy (47%).

Q2 To what extent do you trust the European Union to strengthen security and defence in Europe and better protect its citizens ?

Base.- EU27 (%)




Trust in the EU on security and defence is higher among younger generations, with limited gender differences.

Trust in the European Union's capacity to strengthen security and defence shows relatively little variation by gender: 54% of men and 50% of women express confidence. This four-point difference suggests that attitudes toward EU action are broadly consistent across genders.

Age differences are somewhat more visible, though they remain moderate. Among 15-24- year-olds, 61% trust the EU on these matters. This proportion gradually declines with age: 54% among 25-39 year-olds, 50% among 40-54 year-olds, and 49% among those aged 55 and over.

Q2 To what extent do you trust the European Union to strengthen security and defence in Europe and better protect its citizens ?




National threat perceptions and trust in the EU do not always go hand in hand across Member States.

confidence tending to be higher where alternative security arrangements to the respondent's country are more limited.

When we examine how Member States are distributed along two dimensions (national threat perception and trust in the EU's capacity to address security challenges), four distinct patterns emerge. Some countries combine high perceived threat with strong confidence in the EU. The two Baltic States, Estonia and Lithuania, are prime examples: small countries directly exposed on the front line vis-a-vis Russia, they nevertheless maintain high trust in European-level responses. Denmark and Sweden follow a similar pattern, as does Romania, which shares a lengthy border with Ukraine. In these cases, geographical proximity to conflict appears to strengthen rather than erode confidence in collective action. At the opposite end, several Central and Balkan European countries display neither acute threat perception nor particular confidence in the EU. Slovenia, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Austria fall into this category, expressing relatively low levels on both dimensions. Between these two poles, two contrasting profiles stand out. Luxembourg, Portugal, Malta, and Spain express strong confidence in EU action despite feeling comparatively less exposed to immediate security risks. Conversely, the Netherlands, Germany, and France present the inverse pattern: high threat perception coupled with low trust in the EU's ability to respond. This last group warrants particular attention. France represents the most striking case: with the highest perceived threat level (79%) and the lowest trust in the EU (40%), the country displays close to 40- percentage-point gap between anxiety on security and institutional confidence. These patterns suggest that trust in the EU on security matters appears less determined by the intensity of perceived threats than by each Member State's existing capacity for autonomous defence responses, with

Degree of trust in the European Union to strengthen security and defence in Europe



Degree of agreement with the statement that the nation's security is at risk


2.3. Perceptions of EU investment in defence

Around a third of Europeans say that the EU (32%) or their own country (34%) does not invest enough in defence and security. By contrast, only 14% and 17% respectively think it invests too much.

When asked to assess current levels of investment in defence and security, Europeans express broadly similar views toward both EU and national spending. A substantial minority, around one third, believes that investment levels are insufficient: 32% say the EU does not invest enough, while 34% say the same of their own country. This assessment notably exceeds the proportion who consider spending excessive, which stands at only 14% for the EU and 17% for national budgets. However, the plurality view

in both cases is that the investment levels are appropriate. Some 42% of Europeans believe that the EU invests about the right amount in defence and security,

while 39% hold this view regarding their own country's spending. The remaining 12% (EU) and 10% (national) express no opinion on the matter.



■ It does not invest enough

■ It invests about the right amount

■ It invests too much

■ Don't know / No answer


Those who feel threatened and older respondents are more likely to say the EU underinvests in defence.

The view that EU defence spending is insufficient shows limited variation by gender, with men (34%) and women (31%) expressing broadly similar assessments. Age differences are more notable: demand for increased investment rises progressively from 27% among 15-24-year-olds to 35% among those aged 55 and over. This represents an interesting contrast with trust patterns, where younger Europeans displayed higher confidence in the EU's defence capacity. Unsurprisingly, perceptions of security threats to the respondent's country strongly influence views on investment adequacy. Among those who believe their country's security is threatened, 38% say the EU does not invest enough, compared to just 21% among those who do not share this assessment. This 17-percentage point difference reflects a logical connection between perceived vulnerability and support for strengthened defence spending.

Q3 Thinking about current levels of public spending, how would you assess the level of investment made by each of the following, in defence and security programmes ?

The European Union

Base: EU27 (%)



3. European space policy: impact and priorities

3.1. Perceived impact of EU space programmes on the economy and daily life

Overall, Europeans tend to recognise the impact of EU space programmes more strongly in economic terms than in their day-to-day experience.


When asked about the impact of EU space programmes such as Galileo/EGNOS, Copernicus and IRIS², 45% of respondents consider that these programmes have an important impact on the European economy (13% "a very important impact" and 32% "a fairly important impact"). By contrast, only 32% consider that they have an important impact on EU citizens' everyday lives (9% "very important" and 23% "fairly important"). The survey reveals a disconnect: while many people see EU space programmes as important for Europe's economy and global standing, fewer identify tangible effects on everyday life and direct user benefits.

Q4 In your opinion, how much impact do the European Union's space programmes, such as Galileo/EGNOS, Copernicus and IRIS², have on...?

The European economy



EU citizens' everyday lives



■ A very important impact

■ A fairly limited impact

■ I have not heard about these programmes

■ A fairly important impact

■ No impact at all


■ Don't know / No answer

However, these views vary strongly from one country to another: perceptions of economic impact range from 63% in Cyprus to only 26% in Sweden

This shows that opinions are far from uniform across the EU. How visible and meaningful EU space programmes feel may depend on national context, including how well known these programmes are, how much they are discussed in public, and the level of confidence citizens have in EU action. In fact, there seems to be a correlation between trust in the EU on defence and security and the perception that EU space programmes benefit the economy: in Cyprus, 73% say they trust the EU to strengthen security and defence in Europe and 63% see a strong economic impact of EU space programmes, while in Austria the figures are lower (43% trust and 39% strong economic impact).

Q4 In your opinion, how much impact do the European Union's space programmes, such as Galileo/EGNOS, Copernicus and IRIS², have on...? **The European economy**

Base: EU27 (%)




Younger respondents, men, and employed citizens are more likely to see EU space programmes as economically impactful

Sociodemographic differences also appear in the recognition of economic impact. In the EU27 aggregate, 55% of 15-24-year-olds consider the impact on the economy important, compared with 41% among those aged 55 and over. Men are also more likely than women to report an important economic impact (49% vs 42%). By occupation, the perception of economic impact is highest among the self-employed (54%) and employees (48%), and lower among manual workers (46%) and those not working (39%).

Q4 In your opinion, how much impact do the European Union's space programmes, such as Galileo/EGNOS, Copernicus and IRIS², have on...? **The European economy**

Base: EU27 (%)




3.2. European space policy: impact and priorities

When Europeans are asked to look ahead and identify what should be prioritised in EU space policy and programmes, security and defence clearly emerges as the leading area.

Security and defence clearly comes first: 34% of respondents mention it as their top priority ("Firstly"), ahead of environment and climate action (20%), industrial competitiveness and growth (13%), and safer mobility and transport (10%). This hierarchy becomes even more pronounced when considering the cumulative measure ("Total"), which combines both answers provided by respondents: 53% cite security and defence as a priority, compared with 36% for environment and climate change and 31% for competitiveness and industrial growth. The results therefore position security and defence not only as the most frequently mentioned first priority, but also as the most widely shared priority overall. This strong focus on security and defence therefore seems closely connected to the wider sense of insecurity captured in this Flash Eurobarometer, where a large majority of Europeans express concern about their country's security and more than two thirds agree that their country's security is threatened.

Q5 Looking to the future, which of the following areas should be a priority for the European Union's Space Policy and programmes? Firstly? And then?

Base - EU27 (%)



Comments

(Pierre Dieumegard)

There is an XY graph, unlike most Eurobarometer reports. It's good, because you can see the diversity of opinion among the people of the European Union.

4. Technical specifications

Between the 5th and the 12th of January 2026, Demoscop carried out Flash Eurobarometer 574 at the request of the European Commission, through Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (06 DEFIS). It is a general public survey coordinated by the Directorate-General for Communication, 'Public Opinion and Citizens Engagement' unit.

Flash Eurobarometer S74 covers the population of EU citizens, residents in one of the 27 Member States of the European Union, and aged 15 years and over. Around 1,000 interviews were conducted in larger Member States and around 500 interviews in smaller Member States (Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta). In total, 27 292 interviews were completed.

All interviews were carried via Computer Assisted Web Interviewing (CAWI), using Demoscop's online panels. Respondents were selected from these online access panels, groups of pre-recruited individuals who have agreed to take part in research. Sampling quota were set based on age (15-24 year-olds, 25-39 year-olds, 40- 54 year olds, 55+ year-olds), gender (Male / Female), geographic region (based on NUTS1 or NUTS2 depending on the size of the country) and education level (ongoing education, stopped full time education at the age of 15 or before, between 16 and 19, at the age of 20 or later).

Statistical weighting has been applied to adjust the raw

accurately reflect the true composition of the target population.

Number of interviews per country:					
EU	EU	27292	LV	Latvia	1018
BE	Belgium	1166	LT	Lithuania	1007
BG	Bulgaria	1001	LU	Luxembourg	536
CZ	Czech Republic	1053	HU	Hungary	1117
DK	Denmark	1042	MT	Malta	505
DE	Germany	1098	NL	Netherlands	1202
EE	Estonia	1018	AT	Austria	1000
IE	Republic of Ireland	1167	PL	Poland	1001
EL	Greece	1094	PT	Portugal	1183
ES	Spain	1028	RO	Romania	1001
FR	France	1028	SI	Slovenia	1004
HR	Croatia	1002	SK	Slovakia	1099
IT	Italy	1007	FI	Finland	1202
CY	Cyprus	513	SE	Sweden	1200

figures in each Member State, ensuring that final results

Margin of error

Survey results are subject to sampling tolerances. The 'margin of error' quantifies uncertainty about (or confidence in) a survey result. As a general rule, the more interviews conducted (sample size), the smaller the margin of error. A sample of 1000 will produce a margin of error of not more than 3.1 percentage points, and a sample of 1 500 will produce a margin of error of not more than 2.5 percentage points.

Statistical margins due to sampling tolerances (at the 95 % level of confidence)							
various sample sizes are in rows				various observed results are in columns			
	5 %	10 %	25 %	50 %	75 %	90 %	95 %
n=50	±6.0	±8.3	±12.0	±13.9	±12.0	±8.3	±6.0
n=100	±4.3	±5.9	±8.5	±9.8	±8.5	±5.9	±4.3
n=200	±3.0	±4.2	±6.0	±6.9	±6.0	±4.2	±3.0
n=500	±1.9	±2.6	±3.8	±4.4	±3.8	±2.6	±1.9
n=1000	±1.4	±1.9	±2.7	±3.1	±2.7	±1.9	±1.4
n=1500	±1.1	±1.5	±2.2	±2.5	±2.2	±1.5	±1.1
n=2000	±1.0	±1.3	±1.9	±2.2	±1.9	±1.3	±1.0

5. Questionnaire

NEW

Q1 Given the current international context, to what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statement?

(ONE ANSWER PER LINE)

	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know / No answer!
The security of (OUR COUNTRY) is threatened	1	2	3	4	9
My personal safety is at risk	1	2	3	4	9

NEW

Q2 To what extent do you trust the European Union to strengthen security and defence in Europe and better protect its citizens?

(ONE ANSWER POSSIBLE)

Completely trust	1
Tend to trust	2
Tend not to trust	3
Do not trust at all	4
Don't know / No Answer	99

(DO NOT READ OUT)

NEW

Q3 Thinking about current levels of public spending, how would you assess the level of investment made by each of the following, in defence and security programmes?

(ONE ANSWER PER LINE)

	Not enough	About the right amount	Too much	Don't know / No answer!
The European Union	1	2	3	9
(OUR COUNTRY)	1	2	3	9

NEW

Q4 In your opinion, how much impact do the European Union's space programmes, such as Galileo/EGNOS, Copernicus and IRIS², have on...?

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(ONE ANSWER PER LINE)

	A very important impact	A fairly important impact	A fairly limited impact	No impact at all	I have not heard about these programmes	Don't know / No answer
1) The European economy	1	2	3	4	5	9
2) EU citizens' everyday lives	1	2	3	4	5	9

NEW

Q5 Looking to the future, which of the following areas should be a priority for the European Union's Space Policy and programmes? Firstly? And then?

(RANDOMIZE ITEMS — EXCLUSIVE FOR BOTH OPTIONS)

Action on the environment and climate change	1
Safer mobility and transport	2
Connectivity and digital communications	3
Security and defence	4
Competitiveness and growth of European industry	5
Sustainable and responsible use of space	6
Other	97
Don't know / No Answer	99